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I investigate appointment to the Court of Appeal and House of Lords between 1880 and 2005. Exploiting the fact that appointment is almost invariably from within the ranks of existing High Court judges and using a conditional logit model, I test for effects of legal, professional, and political factors upon appointment prospects. Although there is no advantage to having the same political affiliation as the appointing Lord Chancellor, judges are more likely to be promoted if they were previously appointed by the incumbent party.
Introduction

Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 discussed and voted upon proposals to vest the power of appointment of judges in the executive alone (Farrand 1966, vol 2, 37). Like many of the proposals which gave one branch alone the power to appoint, the appointment of judges by the executive was criticised for inviting "political dealing, patronage, favouritism, and intrigue" (Gauch 1989, 343). Madison "was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the Executive" (Farrand 1966, vol. 1, 120), and Rutledge – though he might have had later cause to regret it (Gauch 1989, 337) – was not "disposed to grant so great a power to any single person" (Farrand 1966, vol. 1, 119). Though objections to any executive involvement continued to be raised, the present system of involving both the executive and the legislature in the appointment of judges was eventually agreed. 

Historically, however, most common law countries have been content to grant this 'great power' of judicial appointment to the executive, either vesting it in a single minister or ministers of the executive acting in collaboration. In England and Wales between 1880 and 2005, the power to appoint judges to the different levels of the English judicial hierarchy was given to two ministers, the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister, whose decisions were subject only to pro forma ratification by the Crown. In Canada between 1875 and 2004, the power to appoint judges to federal courts rested either with the Cabinet acting on the advice of the Attorney-General or, in the case of appointments to the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, with the Prime Minister (Morton 1974, 61) – though once again these decisions were subject to pro forma ratification by the Crown's representative in Canada, the Governor-General. Finally, in Australia between 1903 and (with minor exceptions) the present day (Lynch 2014), the power to appoint judges to federal courts has lain with Cabinet, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, and pursuant to pro forma ratification by the Governor-General (Evans 2001).

In each of these four countries, the appointment of judges by ministers has been criticised for permitting precisely the political dealing and patronage that delegates to the Federal Convention warned of. In Britain in particular, appointment by ministers alone was memorably described by a committee of the House of Commons (a committee with a Conservative majority at a time of Conservative government) as 'nothing short of naked political control' (Rozenberg 1997, 14). Because of the risk that ministerial appointment might cause appointments to be seen as 'political', the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 moved the power to nominate judges to non-political judicial appointment committees, though again the decisions made by these committees must be ratified by the Lord Chancellor (Malleson 2006). This move was near-contemporaneous with moves in Australia and Canada (now since abandoned) to create advisory panels to recommend candidates to the Attorney-General (Lynch 2014, Ziegel 2006). 

Despite the end of the system of ministerial appointment, it is important to study the English system as it operated between 1880 and 2005, and in particular to study the characteristics of appointees. This is so for two reasons. First, the system is an example of a broader system of ministerial appointment of judges which is still present in many common law countries around the world, including not just Australia and Canada but also New Zealand (where reform was again proposed but abandoned: Scottish Government Social Research, 2008) and other non-common law systems such as Sweden, where appointment to the Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) is a matter for the government alone. Thus, the investigation of a historical system allows us to draw conclusions pertinent for currently-existing systems.

Second, the English system merits investigation because it was ordinarily taken to be so influenced by the judiciary that professional considerations excluded any possibility for political patronage. 
Although in theory the Lord Chancellor and Prime Minister could appoint any lawyer of sufficient standing, in practice appointment was largely from within the (necessarily finite) ranks of existing judges. Moreover, the Lord Chancellor's recommendations were made after considerable input from the Lord Chief Justice and other senior judges. For some, judicial appointments in England seemed to follow the practice recounted by that other delegate to the Federal Convention, Benjamin Franklin, who, in "brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice" among themselves (Farrand 1966, vol. 1, 120). Franklin may have been wrong about judicial appointments in Scotland (they remained a matter for the Crown and its ministers until the 2002 establishment of the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland) and about the quality of the resulting nominees (Phillipson 1990, 7), but his assessment of the dominance of the legal profession would have been shared by many who analysed the system which operated in England between 1880 and 2005. 

For this reason, England offers a hard test for the commonly held view of judicial appointment according to which appointment by a single political body acting alone is likely to result in political preferment.​[1]​ If political preferment is found under a system of ministerial appointment where appointment is severely constrained by the legal profession or by a de facto requirement for appointment from within the ranks of existing judges, then a fortiori political preferment is likely also to exist in other systems of ministerial appointment which lack these constraints. 

In this article, I analyze appointment to the Court of Appeal and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords between 1880 and 2005, corresponding to the period between the passage of the Judicature Acts and the creation of the modern English court system (1873–1880) on the one hand, and the reform of the system of judicial appointments initiated by the Blair government (2005-2006), on the other hand. I begin by describing the structure of the system created by the Judicature Acts, before going on to discuss the existing literature on judicial appointments in the UK. I make an argument for the use of discrete choice models in analyzing English judicial appointment, and present the results of a conditional logit model of appointment with independent variables tapping class, educational, legal, and political factors. I argue that appointments to the Court of Appeal and to the Lords are partly political, in that judges previously appointed by a political party have better promotion prospects when that party is in power. In the conclusion, I suggest that my findings concerning judicial appointments in England show that other countries with similar systems of appointment (Australia, New Zealand, Canada) will have to move away from ministerial appointment if they wish to eliminate the role of political preferment. 





The English court system is not now, and never has been, a model of rational organization. It owed what structure it had to the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. These established three ‘senior courts’: the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (hereafter, the Lords). The relationship between these courts, their internal divisions, and the number of judges at each level at the start and end of this period, are shown in Figure 1.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

I focus on the English court system, which covers England and Wales. The legal systems of Scotland and Northern Ireland are separate (though the Lords, in its judicial capacity, had final appellate jurisdiction over Scottish civil cases and Northern Irish civil and criminal cases). Although Scottish and Northern Irish judges were appointed to the Lords, I do not consider these appointments here, because the different court systems make it impossible to compare the career trajectories of judges in the respective systems.

The High Court has both original and limited appellate jurisdiction. At the end of the period in question, the High Court had three divisions: the Chancery division, which hears cases relating to taxation, property and trusts, amongst other issues; the Family division, which hears cases relating to divorce, family property, and proceedings relating to children; and the Queen’s Bench division, by far the largest of the three, which deals with the remaining areas of law, and contains within it a number of specialized courts. This division has changed over time. Before the 1970 Administration of Justice Act, the Family Division was a larger Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, ‘a strange rag-bag of specialties that had grown out of the ecclesiastical court jurisdiction’ (Coleridge 2004).

The Court of Appeal had, as the name suggests, appellate jurisdiction only. It gained appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases with the 1907 Criminal Appeal Act, which created the Court of Criminal Appeal, now the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).





These three courts are staffed by three different types of judges: judges of the High Court; Lord Justices of Appeal; and Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. Normally, only Lords of Appeal in Ordinary may decide cases in the Lords. In theory, the Lord Chancellor – an office which mocked the separation of powers, given that he was head of the judiciary, member of the executive, and speaker of the upper chamber – could join cases in the Lords, but given the political sensitivity of such participation this power was rarely exercised after the Second World War (Woodhouse 2001, p. 116). 

Only Lords Justices of Appeal (including two figures of equivalent or greater rank, the Master of the Rolls, head of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal, and the Lord Chief Justice, head of the Criminal Division) may hear civil cases in the Court of Appeal; but some High Court and more junior judges participate in Criminal Division cases given that division’s heavy workload.

Judges of the High Court may hear cases either in the High Court (where they may often be joined by circuit judges), or in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).





For most of the period under study, appointment to any of these positions (judge of the High Court, LJA, LAO) was restricted to barristers – lawyers specialized in court-room advocacy, as distinct from solicitors. This changed in 1990 with the passage of the Courts and Legal Services Act, which enabled those who had held rights of audience in the High Court or higher courts for at least ten years (thus including certain solicitors), or who had served as a circuit judge for two years or more, to be appointed to the High Court. Lord Justices of Appeal may either

1	be appointed directly from those who meet the former criterion, or may
2	be appointed from the ranks of High Court judges.

Lords of Appeal in Ordinary must have either

1	held higher rights of audience for fifteen years, or
2	have been a member of the High Court, Court of Appeal, or the highest Scottish or Northern Irish courts, for at least two years.





The method of appointment for Lord Justices of Appeal and Lords of Appeal in Ordinary – which was entirely based on custom rather than legislative provisions (Shetreet and Borrie 1976, s47n9) – is described well in one text summarizing the English legal system towards the end of this period:

“Appointment to the positions of … Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and Lord Justice of Appeal are made by the Queen, acting by convention on the advice of the Prime Minister, who in turn will have consulted the Lord Chancellor. The effective voice in all appointments is normally that of the Lord Chancellor, following consultations with members of the judiciary and leading members of the legal profession. Occasionally, the Prime Minister may override the Lord Chancellor’s views in relation to senior staff appointments” (Bailey et al. 2002, 253–54)
This system was grossly antiquated by the time of its abolition in 2005; for it involved two party politicians within the executive deciding unilaterally to make an appointment without any element of open competition or any attempt to solicit applications.

Only by making very strong assumptions about the force of recommendations is it possible to dismiss the possibility of political control of the appointments process. One might, for instance, argue that judicial recommendations acted as a hard constraint on both Lord Chancellor and Prime Minister. But this is not true. Even Lord Chief Justice Coleridge (1880–1894), faced with one of the most partisan Lord Chancellors (Halsbury) had to acknowledge the “the absolute right and the sole responsibility of the Chancellor in regard to these appointments” (Heuston 1964,42). A century later, senior judges consulted on the appointment of a successor to Lord Chief Justice Taylor (not, strictly, an appointment considered in this article, but which was governed by the same procedure) were considerably aggrieved when Mackay simply failed to pass on their recommendations, none of which endorsed the eventual appointee (Sir Thomas Bingham, later Lord Bingham) (Rozenberg 1997,14).

Nor can one argue that the recommendations of the Lord Chancellor act as an apolitical hard constraint on Prime Ministers. Of the twenty-eight Lord Chancellors during this period, only four – Mackay of Clashfern, Simonds, Maugham, and Sankey – had never stood for Parliament, and Maugham had considered it. Most were therefore political actors, and those that were not political actors were only chosen for lack of a better alternative. Sankey was a member of a Labour government which had few supporters amongst the Bar or judiciary; Mackay of Clashfern was only drafted in (initially as Lord Advocate for Scotland, and subsequently, after becoming a Conservative party member, as Lord Chancellor) because the other likely candidate, Conservative MP for Kinross Nicholas Fairbairn QC, was regarded as too flamboyant.

Even if the Lord Chancellor were avowedly non-partisan, or took very seriously the traditional role of protecting judicial independence, his recommendations would not have binding force. Mackay’s (rank-ordered) recommendations were overturned on at least one occasion either by Thatcher or Major (Rozenberg 1997,16), and there is a “suggestion that Mrs Thatcher [also] refused to accept Lord Hailsham’s advice over the appointment of Sir John Donaldson as Master of the Rolls” (Woodhouse 2001,134).

There are, therefore, good grounds for believing that, subject to the de facto constraint that appointment be from within the ranks of existing High Court or Court of Appeal judges, the method of appointment to these two posts – Lord Justice of Appeal and Lord of Appeal in Ordinary – is dominated by the executive, and as such offers an exciting opportunity to test the relative importance of political factors vis-à-vis other factors in judicial appointment. 

Generalizability
In the preceding section, I have described the system used to appoint judges in England and Wales. 
Inevitably, much of this discussion has been cast in terms that are either unique to England and Wales, or only have analogues in other systems inspired by England and Wales. I nonetheless wish to suggest that conclusions derived from the study of the English case can be generalized, insofar as (1) the English system is an example of a particular kind of system used to appoint judges; and insofar as (2) within that kind, differences of degree suggest that the English system is less likely to result in political preferment, such that any positive findings of political preferment should apply with greater force to other systems of this kind.

Generally, we may say that the British system prior to 2005 is a system of ministerial appointment. That is, the nomination, proposal, and ratification of candidates for appointment to the apex court is the exclusive de jure responsibility of one or two members of the executive, acting jointly or separately. In this respect it is to be distinguished from systems where nomination, proposal, and ratification of candidates is the non-exclusive responsibility of the executive – as is the case in a number of apex courts where judges are appointed in part by the executive, in part by parliament, and in part by the judiciary – or where the executive is involved in one, two, or three stages of the appointments process, and where other bodies (judicial appointments commissions, the legislature, the court itself) are involved in the remaining stages. As signalled in the introduction, many of the countries which employ this system are former British colonies. Some are Scandinavian (Denmark prior to 1999; Norway prior to 2002; Sweden and Finland); and others – such as Japan – display more complicated genealogies (see, generally, Malleson 2006; Grendstadt, Shaffer and Waltenburg, 2014, ch. 2; O'Brien 2006).









If “class is the basis of all British politics” (Pulzer 1967), then it ought to be true that class is the basis of all judicial politics in Britain. Certainly, the popular image of judges in Britain is of white males drawn exclusively or at least predominantly from the upper-middle and upper classes (Darbyshire 2011, 21), and liable to act in the interests of that class (Griffith 1977). Indeed, early quantitative research on appointment to the appellate judiciary suggested that family status had a positive effect on promotion prospects (Tate 1992, but see Thomas 2004). The most plausible mechanism is the role of the judiciary in recommending or warning against particular nominees, thereby replicating its current characteristics and patterns of privilege. (Darbyshire 2011,97) reprints a number of derogatory comments made by judges about judicial applicants (‘down and out scruffy’, ‘off-puttingly headmistressy’) in the transition period to the new appointments regime; it is not difficult to imagine other, similar comments in earlier periods, which, though perhaps phrased more gracefully, might give an advantage to higher-status candidates. Consider, for example, Lord Halsbury’s comments on one candidate in a letter to Lord Salisbury: “He [Edward Ridley] is also a poet and has translated Lucan but these I do not insist on as judicial qualifications”(!) (Heuston 1964, 50).





Given the strong links between class and educational attainment in Britain, many of the factors listed under education overlap with factors listed under class. This is particularly true since one obvious measure of educational attainment – having attended a university or not – is of little use in discriminating between candidates for promotion, and thus what measures that remain – having attended either Oxford or Cambridge, and attending elite colleges within those two institutions – are moderately correlated with class. Nevertheless, we might expect that an undergraduate degree from a good university might aid future promotion.

If the advantages of education are purely to do with signalling, or with generalized cultural capital, then any undergraduate degree will be of benefit. If, conversely, the advantage of education is subject specific, then candidates with undergraduate degrees in law should have an advantage. Conventional wisdom has largely viewed an undergraduate education in law as either a waste of time or as an undue restriction on future judges’ intellectual horizons. Heuston (1964) describes the view that talented Oxford undergraduates would do best to secure a First in an unrelated subject and then pick up law in barristers’ chambers. Recently, erstwhile medieval historian Lord Sumption has argued “it is best not to read law as an undergraduate”, and that individuals who have studied other subjects perform better as barristers or judges (Daily Telegraph 2012).

Legal or professional considerations

The third strand of literature on appointment to appellate courts concerns the very idea of ‘promotion’. The traditional view was that “there is no system of promotion of judges in England” (Shetreet and Borrie 1976,78), and that “a man who accepts the office of a judge in England must reckon that he will stay in that position always… This is the same whether he is a high court judge or a... stipendiary magistrate” (Denning 1955,18). This traditional view is certainly not true now: most superior court judges are promoted (Thomas 2004,214), and the claim on appointment grows with time: as one judge put it, “I had done eight years on the High Court bench…. I think I would have been quite disappointed not to have been put in the [Court of Appeal]” (Darbyshire 2011,93).

Exceptions concern the lower ranks: “able barristers who wish to be appointed to the High Court [and, a fortiori, to higher ranks] do not accept an appointment to a judicial office below the level of a High Court judgeship” (Shetreet and Borrie 1976). Although such barristers might accept a part-time role as a Recorder (a judge who sits in Crown or County Courts) – and indeed were encouraged to do so towards the latter part of this period - they would not such a role as a full-time job. Just as accepting an initial full-time judicial office below the level of the High Court can ‘scar’ a future candidate, so too does early progress in the legal profession mark him/her out for future success. Those who are made Queen’s Counsel or appointed to the High Court at a young age are marked out as ‘high-fliers’, and are likely to progress further. 





The current conventional wisdom is that political considerations play no part in judicial appointments. For Derry Irvine (Lord Chancellor under Tony Blair), “politics has never been a factor in appointment to the professional judiciary and as far as I am concerned it never will be nor should be” (Malleson 2009). This statement is clearly false for at least some of the period under study. As Laski (1926,533-534) noted, “of the 139 judges appointed in that period [1832 to 1906], eighty were members of the House of Commons at the time of their nomination; eleven others had been candidates for Parliament”. Lord Chancellor Halsbury was notorious for appointing poor quality judges who were active Conservatives; his Prime Minister, Salisbury, was claimed (by his daughter Gwendolen) to operate on the maxim that “within certain limits of intelligence, honesty, and knowledge of the law, one man would make as good a judge as another, and a Tory mentality was, ipso facto, more trustworthy than a Liberal one” (Heuston 1964,37). 

There are different kinds of political considerations that play a role in appointment (Paterson 1974). First, parties may reward individuals who have previously been active for that party, either by standing for the party in an election or by performing some other service. Paterson (1974) calls these `reward' motive appointments. Second, parties may appoint individuals who they believe share similar ideological preferences to their own. Call these `consensus' motive appointments.  Third, parties may appoint individuals who have held political office, or have carried out other political tasks, on the grounds that these individuals have, in virtue of their office, developed greater social awareness and broader experience.  





On the basis of this previous research, I formulate the following hypotheses. H1 and H2 link to the discussion of class and education respectively; H3-H6 refer to professional and legal considerations; and H7-H8 refer to political considerations.

1	The higher a candidate’s social standing, the more likely s/he is to be promoted
2	The more and better educated a candidate, the more likely s/he is to be promoted
3	The earlier a candidate’s first judicial appointment, the more likely s/he is to be promoted
4	The more experienced a candidate, the more likely s/he is to be promoted
5	Candidates whose first full-time judicial position was to the High Court are more likely to be promoted
6	Candidates specializing in Chancery work are more likely to be promoted than candidates specialized in Queen’s Bench work, who are in turn more likely to be promoted than Family judges
7	Candidates who have the same party affiliation as the governing party are more likely to be promoted




Previous quantitative research on judicial appointments has used one of two inappropriate strategies of statistical modelling. The first strategy is to treat appointment as an appellate judge as a binary variable (Tate 1992; Thomas 2004), and to model promotion using standard (logistic or probit) regression techniques, where independent variables enter into the regression equation. The second strategy is to treat appointment as an appellate judge as a risk alongside resignation, and to model promotion using survival models where independent variables multiply the baseline hazards of appointment or resignation (Salzberger and Fenn 1999).

Each of these strategies has considerable problems. The first strategy cannot cope with the fact that information on recent judges’ promotion is effectively, right-censored: they would have been promoted had we continued to observe them. This problem can only be ameliorated by dropping data towards the end of the sample. The second strategy can cope with this censoring. However, it cannot easily cope with changing characteristics of the judge and of the appointer (in order to investigate Labour and Conservative appointments, Salzberger and Fenn (1999) had to split their sample), cannot cope with promotion to the Court of Appeal followed by promotion to the Lords, and cannot cope with the increased number of opportunities for promotion. The number of Court of Appeal judges has increased considerably over the years, from 18 under the Senior Courts Act 1981, to 37 (Maximum Number of Judges Order 2002). Any characteristic of the candidate pool which has increased over this time will thus have a positive effect on the likelihood of promotion in either a survival or binary regression model. However, this positive effect will be an artifact of the increase in the total number of appointments made. What we really wish to identify is the contribution of each independent variable to being promoted given the characteristics of other candidates.

Conditional logit
Accordingly, I use a conditional logit model, previously used in the same context by Vidal and Leaver (2010). The conditional logit model estimates the probability of candidate  will be appointed on a given occasion , or . This is linked to the binary (1=appointed; 0=not appointed) outcome using a categorical distribution.

The probability of a particular candidate being selected is equal to the sum () of the values, for that candidate at that appointment opportunity, of each of the independent variables () multiplied by each of the associated coefficients (), divided by the sum of these values for all of the candidates.


where  is i.i.d. extreme value.

This means that the probability of a given judge  being appointed depends not on the absolute value of the independent variables for that judge, but the relative value. An extra month’s experience will not improve a judge’s promotion prospects if all other eligible judges have also gained an extra month’s experience. Conversely, a judge ’s promotion prospects might improve without any change in his characteristics if other, better-suited judges drop out of the candidate pool due to death, retirement or promotion, leaving  relatively more qualified.

Constructing the candidate pool





There are exceptions to this general rule. One exception is easily dealt with. Scottish and Northern Irish judges appointed to the Lords are not drawn from within the ranks of the English judiciary. I therefore ignore them in my analysis.





One potential problem with conditional logit models concerns the possibility of unobserved choice set variation. As Desposato (2005) puts it,
[conditional logit] might be used to model workers’ employment decisions, students’ university choices, and prime ministers’ choice of government partners. But unbeknownst to the analyst, some choices simply aren’t in the choice set... A prime minister can’t add an extremist party to her governing coalition if that party rejects the invitation.

The possibility of refusal is present here, given that (for much of the period in question) appointment was offered to candidates; candidates were not invited to apply. However, the general impression is that promotion was an offer that could not be refused. One judge interviewed by (Darbyshire 2011,94) said that he had never heard of anyone refusing promotion; other judges confessed to being reluctant to leave the ‘camaraderie of the Court of Appeal’, but ultimately accepted (Darbyshire 2011,102).

Appointment opportunities
After removing appointments of Scottish and Northern Irish judges, I was left with 282 separate appointment opportunities. Figure 2 plots the distribution of these appointment opportunities across time and party of the appointing Lord Chancellor; plotted points’ y-positions are jittered to prevent over-plotting.

[insert figure 2 here]





















I use two separate variables to test the effect of political considerations. Same Party as Lord Chancellor has a value of +1 if the judge has an identifiable party affiliation, and if this is the same as the party affiliation of the appointing Lord Chancellor; a value of 0 if the judge has no identifiable party affiliation, and a value of -1 if the judge has an identifiable party affiliation which is not the same as the party affiliation of the appointing Lord Chancellor; except that from 1924 I counted Liberal appointees as if they were Labour appointees. PastPartyMatch is a variable which is equal to the number of times a judge has been appointed by the Lord Chancellor’s party minus the number of times that that judge has been appointed by another party, except that from 1924 I counted Liberal appointees as if they were Labour appointees. 

I treat Liberal appointees as though they were Labour appointees because I surmise that if Hypotheses 7 and 8 were correct, Liberal appointees would be likely to be favoured by Labour governments over Conservative appointees, and because in the early part of this period, Labour governments had no Labour appointees to favour. Certainly, the Labour Lord Chancellor at the start of this period – Viscount Haldane – had migrated from the Liberal party, suggesting closeness. 

[insert figure 3 here]

Sparklines of these variables showing averages at each appointment occasion are shown in the figure, together with information on the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum across appointment opportunities. The height of the grey shading behind each sparkline corresponds to the standard deviation. The two class variables show a general decline starting from the Second World War. The same is true for the education variable, although this decline is largely due to the increased representation of universities other than Oxford or Cambridge. A law degree is a curio until the nineteen-thirties, when it begins to be found amongst a fifth of the senior judiciary. As far as the political variables are concerned, most post-war values are tightly bunched around zero; the maxima and minima are broached within the space of four years, from the (Labour) Lord Chancellor Sankey to the (Conservative) Lord Chancellor Hailsham, both serving in national coalition governments.





The results of the conditional logit are shown in the table below. All variables mentioned above are entered in to the model; all of these variables are subsequently interacted with a dummy variable which has value one when the post in question is the post of Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. These interactions, in the spirit of a Chow test, allow us to account for differences in significant factors between different levels of the judicial hierarchy. An additional interaction term is included, which has value one when the post in question is the post of Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and the candidate is a High Court judge.​[3]​ The expectation regarding each variable is also listed.

[insert table 1 here]

Conditional logit models may produce incorrect estimates if the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is violated. One way of testing for violations of IIA is to carry out a Hausman test between the same model evaluated on two sets of data: one full set of data, and one set of data where, for each appointment opportunity, a random 10% sample of unselected choices is dropped. To the extent that the Hausman test reveals significant differences between these two models, the IIA assumption is violated. I report the average p-value across twenty replications of this procedure (Martin and Stevenson 2001). Since the p-value is greater than 0.05, we cannot reject the IIA assumption, and may use a conditional logit model.

The predictive performance of the model can be assessed by the percentage of appointments correctly predicted, which, at 26.95%, may seem low – but then it must be borne in mind that the percentage correctly predicted by a null model, where each individual in the pool of candidates has equal chance of being selected, is even lower, at approximately , or 1.79%.

The coefficients in the model can be interpreted as log-odds ratios, such that a change of one unit in  improves the odds of appointment relative to other candidates by . For ease of interpretation, these exponentiated coefficients are shown in the left hand side of the table below. The right hand side of the same table shows the sum of the main effect together with the interaction effect found when the vacancy is for a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Both sides of the table shows the associated 95% credible intervals for these variables.





Of the three class variables, none have a significant main effect, and although all of these main effects have the right sign, their magnitude is in all cases very close to zero. Considering the effect of class for appointment as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, there are mixed findings. Family status and attendance at a Clarendon private school have a negative sign, and the effect of attending a Clarendon private school is significantly different from zero. However, higher values of clubbishness – which, unlike the other two variables, is not primarily ascriptive – positively affect candidates’ odds of being promoted to Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. The least favoured candidate will therefore be a candidate who has attended a very expensive private school, but who has not parlayed this status into broad social connections through the use of gentleman's clubs. 

Education




Many of the legal and professional variables are important predictors of the likelihood of promotion. However, the influence of these variables differs importantly across the two levels, in ways which are not immediately obvious from inspecting the values of the coefficients themselves. Considering first appointment as Lord Justice of Appeal, we see that greater experience and having taken up a first full-time post at the High Court level aid promotion, as does being younger at the time of one’s first full-time judicial position. Of these three, being a high-flier has the largest effect.

Inspecting the values of the coefficients for the interaction terms involving these variables might suggest that these boons become banes at a later stage – but in fact, all that happens is that two of these factors – experience, and high-flier status – cease to discriminate between candidates for appointment as Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Precocious judges who acquired their first full-time position early do, however, retain their advantage, the magnitude of which is almost unchanged.





I made two separate hypotheses concerning political factors: the first, pertaining to clear partisan affiliation, and a second, pertaining to the past history of appointees. Insofar as clear partisan affiliation is no longer common amongst the judiciary, and insofar as partisan affiliation might be a boon for ‘reward motive’ type appointments of a kind that most commentators believe died out in the early part of the twentieth century, the hypothesis concerning partisan affiliation was ex ante less likely. Indeed, the effect of Same Party as Lord Chancellor is significant in terms of appointment as Lord Justice of Appeal – but it is significant in the wrong direction. Thus, if anything, Lord Chancellors reward partisans of different colors. Although there is a statistically significant positive effect when it comes to promotion as Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, once again inspect of the odds-ratios and their associated 95% credible intervals shows that this merely means that the negative effect at one level is ameliorated when it comes to appointment to the Lords.





The model discussed above concerns appointments made over the period 1880 to 2005. 
It might reasonably be objected that many things changed over this period, and that it is therefore misleading to characterise the weight of particular characteristics by use of a single coefficient applicable at any time during this period. In particular, it might be thought that the findings with respect to political characteristics are not characteristic of the entire period, but rather characterise the early part of this period. 

For example, Stevens (1993) has argued that what he called reward motive appointments ceased by the late 1920s. I therefore re-estimate the model including interaction terms between (a) a dummy indicating whether the appointment is made before the 28th March 1928 (before the end of Viscount Cave's tenure as Lord Chancellor), and (b) either Past Party Match, or Same Party As Lord Chancellor. If these interaction terms are significant and positive, it would indicate that the weight of political considerations in this early period is greater than the weight of political considerations during the remainder of the period.

[ insert table 3 here]

As the table shows, neither of these interaction terms is significant, and the coefficients have opposing signs. Therefore we cannot conclude that the effect of political factors on appointments during the early part of this period was significantly different. This may simply be due to the limited number of appointments during this period, compared to the much larger number of appointments from the nineteen-eighties onwards, as the number of vacancies increased.

More generally, we can interact all of the variables in the model with a time dummy, thereby allowing for changes in the effects of these variables over time. We can then check whether models which include these interactions (at various points in time) result in a significant improvement in model fit. I therefore calculate the value of one particular model fit statistic, the BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion), on models interacted with date dummies which have value one if the date is after the 1st January 1920, 1925, 1930, up until 1990. The BIC measures model fit, but also includes a penalty which increases the more parameters are included in the model. The smaller the value of the BIC, the better the fit.

[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]

As the line shows, there is no value of the BIC for the models with date interactions which is smaller than the value of the BIC for the model without date interactions. Therefore, allowing the effects of all of these variables to vary over time does not improve model fit by this measure.

Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that the method by which judges are appointed to the Court of Appeal and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords makes it possible to identify the characteristics which matter for selection in a way that has often not been possible in the study of judicial selection. Using a conditional logit model, and data spanning one hundred and twenty years, I showed that whilst class generally matters little, political preferment does matter for appointment to these courts, in that judges with the ‘right’ appointment history enjoyed a considerable advantage over other candidates for the same post.

These findings challenge a stream of research about top-level judicial appointments in Britain. First, the null finding with respect to class cuts against the grain of much qualitative and quantitative research on British judges. Certainly, status advantage is at the heart of existing quantitative research on judicial selection in the UK (Tate 1992; Thomas 2004; Vidal and Leaver 2010). However, it is important to qualify this finding. Just because class does not matter for appointment to the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords does not mean that class does not matter in general. There are considerable barriers to candidates from non-traditional backgrounds entering the law (Zimdars 2010), entering elite barristers’ chambers, and entering the judiciary (Genn 2008). What this research shows is that, had those barriers earlier in the promotions pipeline been resolved, the Court of Appeal and House of Lords would not have remained a bastion of the upper class.

Second, these findings challenge the conventional wisdom that the appointments process is non-political. This is conventional wisdom not just because governments have repeatedly argued that the appointments process is non-political, but because the academic literature so far has not been able to demonstrate a link between politics and selection (Salzberger and Fenn 1999). Of course, as I have argued, previous research has used modelling strategies which do not capture the competitive and relative nature of judicial appointments.  

This does not imply that judges’ behavior once they arrive in the Court of Appeal or House of Lords in any way reflects this political pattern found in appointments. Previous research argued that it is simply not possible to identify political ‘splits’ between judges in the House of Lords; all one can identify are differences in propensity to dissent (Hanretty 2013). It is possible that judges might display differing political worldviews in their ratio decidendii, or in their obiter dicta, but such differences (if they exist) are difficult to test for.
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Figure 1: English judicial hierarchy


Figure 2: Appointments by time and party






Table 1: Conditional logit models
	Main effect	LAO vacancy
Variable (expectation)	Est.	SE	Est.	SE










Same Party as Lord Chancellor (+)	-0.65*	0.30	1.16	0.60
Past Party Match (+)	2.45***	0.20	-1.38***	0.29





Avg. p-value for rejecting IIA assumption	0.45			

Notes: Right hand column shows coefficients for the reported variables interacted with a vacancy in the Lords. Stars indicate significance levels: * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001

Table 2:  Odds-ratios

	Main effect		LAO vacancy	
One unit change in… (expectation)	OR	CI	OR	CI










Same Party as Lord Chancellor (>1)	0.53	[0.33,0.86]	1.54	[0.63,3.27]
Past Party Match (>1)	11.85	[8.85,15.95]	2.96	[2.2,4.11]

Notes: The left-hand column shows, for promotion to the Court of Appeal, the ratio of the odds following a one unit change in the relevant variable, holding all other variables constant. The right hand column shows the same information except for promotion to the Lords. 















Same Party as Lord Chancellor (+)	-0.44*	0.35	1.08	0.62
Past Party Match (+)	2.40***	0.20	-1.38***	0.27
High Court judge, LAO vacancy (-)			-2.74***	0.52
Same party as LC * pre-1928	-0.71	0.58		
Past party * pre-1928	0.61	0.52		

Notes:  * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001






^1	 	This view is implicit in official documents and 'best practice' recommendations like Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which recommends (Principle I.2(c)) that "the authority taking the decision on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the government and the administration."
^2	 	The Lords had earlier (before World War II) sat in the plenum.
^3	 	In supplementary models I have estimated separate models for Court of Appeal and House of Lords vacancies. The results, which are extremely similar, are available on request.
